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COGNITIVE COORDINATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND CLUSTERS: 
AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The present paper is an early attempt of conceptualizing the existence and 
dynamics of industrial clusters in a perspective that, while focusing on 
cognitive issues, also draws inspiration from game theory and organizational 
economics. The paper is unabashedly speculative and strongly exploratory, 
but illustrates its basic ideas with an empirical case. 
 The cluster perspective, which will be summarized in section II, is a quite 
heterogeneous one.  However, it generally portrays systemic relations between 
organizations as the cornerstone of local social and economic development. 
Allegedly, such relations allegedly facilitate competitive advantage though the 
emergence, maintenance and development of strong external economies, for 
example the forms of flexible specialization and innovation in interaction 
between firms and their environments. The literatures on regional innovation 
systems and industrial districts are closely related to the cluster literature, 
drawing upon similar arguments, and often describing regional innovation 
systems and industrial districts as different types of clusters.  
 While some parts of the cluster literature are fairly practical and 
concentrate on empirically illustrating the impacts of service providers and 
universities on firm-level innovation rates, there is a growing literature with 
an approach to the regional context of innovation processes that is more taken 
up with conceptual and theoretical development. Even if these scholars rarely 
use the term, we may say that they are preoccupied with describing the 
industrial structures and institutions that best facilitate the coordination of 
strategies and activities of multiple agents within regional systems of firms. 
Particular attention has been devoted to the problems of coordinating 
economic interactions between business entrepreneurs ⎯ spanning from 
vertical supplier relations to horizontal strategic alliances or collective action. 
 The cluster literature is rich in interesting proposals, mainly based upon 
case studies. It has, however, been accused of a lack of clear theoretical 
concepts and of making empirically unsubstantiated claims (see, e.g., Casson 
2000; Markusen 1999). While some of these weaknesses must be ascribed to 
the relative young age of the cluster perspective, it its true that few scholars 
have sought to provide theoretical accounts of, for example, the well-
functioning market coordination that they claim to observe in regional 
agglomerations of firms. To us, it seems obvious that the cluster literature 
would benefit from incorporating more theoretical insight into issues of 
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coordination, and the present paper is an early and speculative attempt of 
infusing some economics and game theory ideas into the cluster literature. A 
natural source for such insights would be the economics of organization, that 
is, the well-established economics literature on the organization of economic 
activities across contracts and governance structures. However, the 
contemporary core of economics of organization ⎯  transaction cost theory, 
agency theory and incomplete contracts theory ⎯  does not provide sufficient 
insights into all issues of coordination. This is why we also draw on 
communication theory, knowledge-based approaches to firms and markets, as 
well as some game theory ideas. 
 For quite some time, organizational economics scholars have devoted 
most of their attention to unpacking one particular category of coordination 
problems, namely problems of cooperation between agents that may arise as a 
consequence of asymmetric information and self-interested behavior. The 
cluster literature may benefit  ⎯  and has already benefited to some extent ⎯ 
from this theoretical insight in understanding how particular institutions 
facilitate cooperation amongst local entrepreneurs. However, the economic 
organization literature still pays relatively little attention to coordination 
problems that do not turn on misaligned interests, but rather on agents having 
incomplete, incorrect or different beliefs about each other or differing 
knowledge about particular tasks ⎯ what we shall call cognitive coordination 
problems. We argue that the economics of organization has neglected 
cognitive coordination at its own peril, because of its  importance for 
processes of interaction, including innovation processes.  The two types of 
coordination problems and their solutions are clearly related; for example, 
cognitive coordination may imply that entrepreneurs form positive beliefs 
about each other which in turn lower transaction costs and facilitate trade and 
specialization. However, often it makes sense to consider cognitive problems 
and the solutions to these in isolation.  For example, in innovation processes, 
when cognitive coordination means that entrepreneurs share a language or 
“code book”, communication and knowledge sharing costs are lowered, 
possibly boosting the rate of interactive innovation. 
 The central argument of this paper is that not only does a cluster function 
as a structure of incentives that is defined by explicit and implicit contracts 
and by reputation and competitive mechanisms, it also facilitates cognitive 
coordination by defining specialized cognitive categories and by singling out 
certain solutions to coordination problems as dominant ones. We provide a 
theoretical account for what cognitive coordination is and how it may come 
about in a cluster. The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the 
cluster perspective, and identifies the industrial activity areas in which a 
cluster benefits from market coordination. The section deals with horizontal 
and vertical relations between firms in turn. Section III then discusses the 
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incentive-related and cognitive aspects of coordination, arguing that cognitive 
coordination achieved through shared knowledge of entrepreneurs is a central 
form of coordination within a cluster, and may allow for both communication 
and interaction with low transaction costs. Section IV addresses the processes 
of cognitive coordination, how shared knowledge comes about. It describes 
how entrepreneurs may build knowledge jointly with partner firms, and how 
shared knowledge may also be a cognitive social institution, namely as a set 
of focal points that ease the process of interaction.  In section V, we argue that 
focal points often come about through analogy making, and that analogy 
making has both information costs and cognitive costs. This renders the 
amount of shared experiences of entrepreneurs and the density of social 
learning processes within a cluster central for its level of cognitive 
coordination. Finally, section VI presents an empirical example of how 
cognitive coordination may look like and how cognitive coordination may 
come about in a cluster, circumscribed by social learning processes. 
 
II. Industrial Clusters and Coordination 
 
Industrial clusters 
The cluster perspective is developed in a growing heterogeneous literature of 
both a theoretical and an empirical nature (see e.g. Arthur 1990; Anderson 
1994; DeBresson 1996; Staber et al 1996; Rosenfeld 1997; Steiner 1998; 
Roelandt and Hertog 1999, Porter 1998; 2000; Schmitz 1999; Hill and 
Brennan 2000). The perspective rests upon the heritage of thinkers such as 
Smith (1776), Marshall (1891) and Schumpeter (1934), and sometimes comes 
with an Austrian economics flavor (e.g. Hayek 1937). More explicitly, it 
draws upon recent literatures such as the national innovation system 
perspective (e.g. Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993); regional studies; and 
economic geography (e.g. Piore and Sabel 1984; Scott and Storper 1986).  
 A cluster can, in its most basic form, be described as a relatively bounded 
and geographically proximate group of firms between which there are 
systemic relations.  Some scholars (e.g. Edquist 1997) focus upon how a 
cluster may promote quite wide-ranging process and product innovations. 
Others emphasize that systemic firm relations in a cluster also facilitate 
variety and flexibility when firms (re-) combine their knowledge through 
flexible supplier arrangements and hence “avoid lock-in to a given 
technology” (Storper 1992: 62).  Clusters are often seen as particularly 
successful groups of firms (i.e., with above-average economic growth), even if 
this assumption is sometimes not made explicit, and is difficult to test 
empirically.1
                                                          
1  For example, evaluating whether a system of firms experiences “above average” 
economic growth implies difficult exercises of determining the system’s exact 
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 One subcategory of industrial clusters is dubbed regional innovation 
systems. The literature on regional innovation systems (for example, Asheim 
1997; Asheim and Cooke 1999; Braczyk et al 1998; De La Mothe and Paquet 
1998, and Edquist 1997) often takes a very explicit focus upon geographical 
proximity, and, indeed, technological innovation. In describing regional 
innovation systems, most scholars include a range of local public or semi-
public local organizations that support firm-level innovation. Indeed, some of 
the regional innovation system literature is preoccupied with correlating 
regional innovation rates (for example, as measured by patent data) with 
regional infrastructures that are seen as particularly supportive for innovation 
⎯ notably, universities and other providers of research and knowledge-
intensive services. A strand of literature that addresses innovation with more 
of an emphasis on theory development claims that local social institutions, 
such as social conventions and culture, are also central to the nature of a 
regional innovation system.  
 The cluster perspective is also related to ⎯ and often borrows from ⎯ the 
literature on industrial districts within regional studies (e.g. Becattini 1990; 
Brusco 1992; Bianchi 1993). According to this literature, industrial districts 
are clusters that are particularly geographically proximate and institutionally 
“thick” (Amin and Thrift 1994). Relatedly, scholars point to the importance 
for clusters of social capital ⎯ (regional) configurations of social relations 
and social conventions ⎯ that are particularly conductive to economic 
welfare (e.g. Burt 1992; Maskell 2000).2   Some have argued that such 
institutional structures may be analyzed as rent-yielding resources that are 
shared in a group of interacting firms but may nevertheless be costly to imitate 
for firms that do not belong to the cluster (e.g., Foss and Eriksen 1995; 
Maskell et al. 1998) 
 
Clusters Facilitate Coordination 
We accept the claim made in the literature that it is possible to distinguish 
clusters of firms with systemic properties, i.e. carrying out (some) endemic 
activities. Rather than going into the debate of whether firms in a cluster are 
more successful ⎯ for example, regarding innovation ⎯ than other firms, the 
paper concentrates upon casting some light on the distinguishing features of a 
cluster. What is it that makes a cluster different to the “outside world”? Our 
central notion is that a cluster emerges to the extent that a group of agents 
establish ⎯ intendedly and/or un-intendedly ⎯ mechanisms of coordination 
that strongly reduce the various transaction costs involved in the process of 
                                                                                                                              
boundaries and finding relevant sectors and markets to which to compare it. 
2  See Woolcock (1998) for a review of the social capital literature. 
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coordinating the process of innovation between legally independent firms, and 
where these coordination mechanisms are specific to the set of geographically 
bounded agents.3  This means that clusters are able to rely on market 
mechanisms to a very large extent. Market coordination works in both the 
horizontal and the vertical dimensions. 
 
Horizontal coordination 
First, some clusters manifest particularly strong and well-developed 
horizontal market coordination between firms that are specialized within 
similar activities.4 Horizontal specialization often leads to agglomeration 
economies, in the guise of a) specialization of local labor markets 
(specialization of local education bodies, attraction of skilled labor, and 
boosting skill levels within some fields through education and on-job 
training); and b) rich local infrastructures of supporting associations and 
specialized service providers (private firms, plus public service providers, 
such as research institutions and universities). Some of these agglomeration 
economies can arise spontaneously when many local firms carry out similar 
activities and demand similar services. However, the creation (and 
maintenance) of many supportive infrastructures demands local entrepreneurs 
to coordinate their actions (Schmitz 1999). For example, joint action of 
entrepreneurs is necessary to run local trade associations; change local course 
offers in education institutions; or influence local policymakers.  
 Another aspect of horizontal market coordination is technological 
spillovers. Technologies and designs have a propensity to spill over between 
firms that share basic technologies and training background of managers and 
employees, through monitoring and imitation or even active knowledge 
sharing (von Hippel 1988) or R&D collaborations (Foss and Eriksen 1995).  
Some spillovers may simply accompany co-location of firms with related 
activities and technologies, for example, in the form of informal know-how 
trading (von Hippel 1988).  Formal knowledge sharing or R&D collaboration 
are ambiguous and risky activities that often involve substantial contractual 
hazards. Such activities pose particularly strong requirements for coordinating 
mechanisms and institutions. 
 
Vertical coordination 
Second, many clusters are also vertical systems of firm relations, i.e. value 
                                                          
3  An economist would argue that these mechanisms are “semi-public” or “club 
goods.” 
4  This often means more specialized than just in the same industrial sector. 
Further, some activities of firms may also cut across traditional sector 
boundaries. 
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chains. A part of the capacity of a cluster is in fact to facilitate a continuously 
expanding specialization between firms, fostering learning and scale 
advantages within single firms. Vertical specialization and value chain 
relations may further boost user-producer innovation (Lundvall 1992). Value 
chains with flexible supplier relations ⎯  i.e., flexible specialization ⎯  also 
facilitate flexibility of the single firms and raises their product offer, but also 
demand that firms are able to quickly find new partners and collaborate with 
low transaction costs. This also necessitates coordinated behavior.  We 
consider this next. 
 
III. Coordination:  The Roles of Incentives and Beliefs 
 
It is a quite common theme in the literature that, somehow, clusters coordinate 
firms’ action, for example, by reducing uncertainty (e.g., Camagni 1991).  The 
exact mechanisms by which such coordination is accomplished are, however, 
seldom spelled out, although a few contributors have tried to establish 
typologies over these (e.g, Foss and Eriksen 1995; Lazaric  and Lorenz 1996; 
Foss and Lorenzen 2002).  We here distinguish between coordination 
problems that primarily relate to how to align the differing incentives of the 
parties and problems that relate to how to make agents choose strategies so 
that they implement a preferred equilibrium, irrespective of any incentive 
conflicts.  
 
Incentive Coordination 
First, reputational effects may work to align interests and behavior amongst 
local entrepreneurs. Regional systems of social rules and conventions ⎯  for 
example, on how to cooperate and share knowledge ⎯  and social sanctions 
against those who breach these conventions can be a very efficient way to 
avoid opportunistic behavior within the relatively bounded group of local 
entrepreneurs who depend upon each other’s future collaboration.  These 
mechanisms are likely to work smoothly in clusters, precisely because of the 
geographical bounds on the group of interacting agents.   Another regional 
mechanism that can align the interests and behavior of local entrepreneurs is 
the existence ⎯  at least in some clusters ⎯  of local facilitators, professional 
mediators or organizations that specialize in coordinating new partnerships 
between entrepreneurs.  Such coordinated activity facilitates business that 
would otherwise under uncertainty be risky or expensive in terms of 
transaction costs ⎯ for example, inter-firm collaboration with high sunk 
costs, or knowledge sharing with potential competitors.  
 However, Foss and Lorenzen (2002) point to the somewhat neglected, but 
nevertheless obvious point that the coordination of behaviors does not always 
hinge upon providing the right incentives. In fact, it is usually in the interests 
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of regularly interacting firms to cooperate and refrain from opportunistic 
behavior (as noted already by Macaulay 1963); their relations are governed by 
implicit, self-enforcing contracts.  Such implicit contracts may be generalized 
so that a cluster is governed by an overarching implicit and opportunism-
reducing contract.   However, even if such implicit contracts exist, there may 
still be other kinds of coordination problems left.   In game theory terms, the 
kind of incentive related coordination problems that we have just briefly 
discussed are often called “cooperation problems”.  The kind of coordination 
problems that do not turn on misaligned incentives are usually simply called 
“coordination problems” (of “pure” or “impure” varieties).   We consider 
these problems next.   
 
Cognitive coordination 
Lazaric and Lorenz (1996) point toward a second mechanism that reduces 
uncertainty in a cluster and coordinates behavior, namely that firms may 
control shared knowledge. A shared technological language can allow for 
“transcoding” (Camagni 1991) between firms, i.e. make them understand each 
other’s technologies, methods, etc. Another type of shared knowledge may be 
entrepreneurs’ common strategies of how to behave and collaborate. This 
shared knowledge align their behavior ⎯  as well as expectations as to their 
partner’s strategies and behavior. This type of shared knowledge thus has a 
large potential for facilitating cooperation.  
 When shared knowledge, which may result in convergent expectations 
(plans, strategies), facilitates the coordination of behaviors, we may talk about 
cognitive coordination (Foss and Lorenzen, forthcoming 2002). Cognitive 
coordination may also take place within a particular organization. For 
example, rules and routines ⎯  i.e. shared knowledge ⎯ are typically 
developed within firms and corporations. Indeed, according to some writers 
(e.g., Kogut and Zander 1993), this is what distinguish them from markets, in 
terms of coordinating communication and behavior of agents (who, in this 
case, are employees). The argument is, simply put, that employees of a firm 
will understand each other better and trust each other more than agents in the 
market. Much critique has been raised against this argument, pointing both 
towards the fact that there may be considerable coordination as well as 
cooperation problems within firms, and towards the high level of shared 
knowledge and coordination taking place in some markets, i.e. between firms.  
 We agree with this critique, because we argue that cognitive coordination 
is empirically a central ingredient of a cluster and that such cognitive 
coordination rests upon a basis of shared knowledge that serve as focal points 
for the coordination of actions (Foss and Eriksen 1995). Here, shared 
knowledge and cognitive coordination has two main impacts upon innovation. 
First, shared strategies can make entrepreneurs cooperate. Second, shared 
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code books can make them understand each other, and hence benefit from the 
information they get through their cooperation.  Although much of the 
relevant literature has been alert to the importance of such shared knowledge, 
little attention has been devoted to the processes that result in this knowledge.  
 
IV. Processes of Cognitive Coordination 
 
If shared knowledge provides cognitive coordination, how does shared 
knowledge come about? What is the character of such processes of 
institutional development?  And, once created, how exactly does shared 
knowledge effect cognitive coordination?  
 
Shared knowledge through collaboration 
Two firms may come to share knowledge through their direct relations to each 
other. For example, in the course of a collaboration, they may learn about 
each other’s processes, and become better in understanding each other’s 
technologies. Thus, they may develop what Loasby (1998) calls “indirect 
capabilities.” This may form the basis for adopting the partner’s technologies.  
Further, they may learn about each other’s interests and strategies, and align 
these over time (Håkansson 1989), gradually creating partner-specific trust.5 
However, building shared knowledge through relations between firms is a 
process that is costly in terms of both time and effort. This is why some 
entrepreneurs choose to rely on trust that has already been formed outside the 
business sphere, hence limiting much collaboration to networks of families, 
friends, or friends’ friends. 
 
Focal points 
Shared knowledge may, however, also derive from the broader social context 
in which entrepreneurs find themselves. Different firms may be able to 
communicate about some technical issues when their staff share formal 
educational background, for example, they have are engineers.  In a cluster 
perspective, provision of such shared code books for coordination between 
local firms is one important effect of regional educational institutions, like 
universities. However, many issues, even of technical nature, have a large 
content of tacit knowledge, and their communication between firms demands 
a shared practical know-how rather than similar formal education. A cluster 
                                                          
5  Note that when we speak of trust here and in the following, we do not refer to the 
kind of trust that exists to reduce problems of opportunism. Rather, the trust 
considered relates to believing that another person meets a certain level of 
competence with respect to his contribution to joint activities or the services that 
he is carrying out for a principal.  
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constitutes a regional production system where firms are specialized within 
similar industrial activities, meaning that local firms may have a range of 
similar practical experiences. Further, as firms are connected in complex and 
shifting local production networks ⎯ and are able to monitor each other ⎯  
social processes of learning (Bandura 1977) raise their general level of shared 
experiences and common knowledge about core technologies. All this means 
that firms within a cluster are often able to understand each other’s 
technologies to higher degrees than outsider firms. 
 In a cluster, social learning processes may also result in common strategies 
amongst local entrepreneurs, what Schelling (1960) refers to as focal points. 
Focal points can function as code books or as common strategies to apply 
when interacting. Focal points that are shared by a large group of 
entrepreneurs can thus align their general behavior and expectations, 
stimulating social trust (i.e. trust that is not partner-specific, but mutual 
between all members of a particular group). Social trust thus hinges upon 
cognitive coordination, as managers have aligned positive expectations about 
each other and ascribe trustworthiness to each other on the grounds of 
membership of the group as a supplement to (or in some cases as a substitute 
for) personal knowledge of each other. 
 In the following, we further aim to unpack the social learning processes 
that result in cognitive coordination. The argument we make can be applied to 
cognitive coordination processes in general, but is applied here to a cluster to 
explain why particularly dense patterns of shared knowledge and relatively 
high levels of cognitive coordination may evolve in such regional contexts. 
 
V. Social Learning and Analogy Making  
 
Social learning and geographical proximity 
A strategy becomes routinized when an agent experiments and re-applies the 
strategy that is relatively efficient. However, in a cluster, all agents need not 
rely on their own personal experience with a full specter of strategies, rather, 
the learning processes of most of them consist of imitation of neighbors rather 
than experimentation: They imitate the observed successful strategies applied 
by others. Through social learning, common focal points becomes 
institutionalized as “meta-routines” in a cluster, hence allowing the population 
of local entrepreneurs to coordinate their expectations (Bandura 1977). Social 
learning processes work smoothly between entrepreneurs in a cluster 
compared to the outside world, because of an abundance of strong and weak 
ties (Granovetter 1973), facilitated by the geographical proximity of local 
entrepreneurs. Proximity promotes face-to-face interactions along with 
monitoring and gossip, and hence shared experiences and points of reference. 
A geographically proximate production system that experiences growing 
10 
economic activity, specialization and inter-firm cooperation, also increases its 
number of inter-firm interactions, and hence the prevalence of shared focal 
points within a cluster may grow over time.  
 
Focal points as analogy making 
But what determines which focal points will evolve in a cluster? We shall 
argue that analogies to earlier interaction situations are particularly important 
here.6  In our argument, a focal point ⎯ i.e., a shared strategy ⎯ arises when 
a whole group of agents make similar analogies. For example, the shared 
strategies and expectations that leads to social trust can be seen as constituting 
similar analogy making by a group of entrepreneurs: They all ascribe 
trustworthiness to each other on the ground that they belong to a particular 
social group (they are locals). This is the same type of analogy as a patient 
makes when he trusts a doctor, not because he knows him as a person, but 
because he ascribes trustworthiness to doctors in general. 
 Some focal analogies seem to be almost ubiquitous. Some basic logical or 
practical problems, some of which may date back to the dawn of human 
evolution, seem to have been solved the same way throughout human history, 
giving rise to focal points common to most human agents, as they make 
analogy to the same precedent solutions. For example, the very basic problem 
of how to divide a sum may haven rise to the almost ubiquitous principle of 
equal division (as Hayek 1973 speculates). Other focal analogies have given 
rise to only a few competing strategies. For example, given the problem ”pick 
a number”, primes, or the first number in a sequence, or the only even 
number, etc. are competing focal points. Like the principle of equal division, 
these focal points are likely to have evolved in coordination situations long 
ago.  
 However, focal points like even numbers are not universal. Some basic 
coordination problems have been solved differently in different groups of 
agents. Sometimes, a relatively small group of agents solve a particular 
coordination problem that is relevant for them only, and may re-use their 
solution strategy later for coordination purposes by analogy. Consequently, 
this type of focal points is much more specific and with more limited 
applicability. We shall argue that a cluster constitutes a good example of such 
situations with narrowly defined coordination problems and specific focal 
points as solutions, because it comprises a limited and often fairly stable 
number of agents, facing a limited range of specialized and related tasks.
                                                          
6  There is evidence from experimental game theory for this.  In this body of 
literature analogy is discussed under the heading of precedent formation and 
utilization in repeated games, that is, how past equilibrium experiences may 
transfer across games (e.g. Knez 1998). 
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 In an interaction situation, an agent is placed in a strategic situation and is 
therefore concerned about what the other agents will do.  In some cases he 
will try to figure out what analogies other agents may resort to. Thus, there is 
a higher-level coordination problem of choosing the same analogy (cf. Sugden 
1989: 94).  What, then, determines which analogy is chosen? And how can we 
explain that in a cluster, the same analogies are chosen by all (or most) local 
agents, resulting in dominating focal points that may be very different from 
those of agents outside the cluster?  Our central propositions concerning this 
problem is that making analogies has both cognitive and information costs, 
and that single agents in a cluster balance these with the benefits of strategies 
in determining the focal points that will win out, and that this balancing takes 
place through social learning within the cluster. 
 
Cognitive costs of analogy making 
First, we suggest that the focal points that evolve within clusters are limited 
by the cognitive costs of making analogies.  Cognitive costs are the resource 
costs of not being able to efficiently process (digest, store, retrieve, 
synthesize, memorize....) information.7  It is different from search costs, which 
are the resource costs of acquiring certain pieces of information.  Even if a 
range of information is available to a given agent, he will make sense of only 
a subcategory of this, depending upon what he “scans” for and depending 
upon his prior knowledge. How much he benefits from the information that he 
has obtained further depends upon his capacity to process it (i.e. to combine it 
with his previously obtained information and preexisting knowledge). In 
short, even with an abundance of information, little is obtained, and even less 
leads to learning, if it is very different from the information and knowledge 
we already posses.8 There is quite some ambiguity in the literature concerning 
what cognitive structures consist of ⎯ mental capacities, language skills, etc. 
⎯ and whether they can be different between agents, can change over time, 
and so on.  
 However, some cognitive structures are most likely dependent upon the 
physiology of the human brain (Hayek 1952) and equally apply to everybody. 
In other words, some cognitive costs are ubiquitous. Concerning analogy 
making in a cluster, the similarities and differences (i.e., the degree of 
isomorphism) between earlier situations and the present determine the size of 
                                                          
7  For pertinent work on cognitive learning in economics, see Brenner (1999).  One 
effect of cognitive costs, as we have defined them, is cognitive dissonance (see 
Festinger 1957).  
8  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that organizations also have “absorptive 
capacities”⎯  internal structures that determine what they can do with the 
information that they have access to. 
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the cognitive costs of making an analogy. This argument is inspired by 
Weitzenfeld’s (1984) enlightening discussion of reasoning by analogy. While 
aimed at understanding the limits of the use of reasoning by analogy in 
scientific discourse, there is no reason why its insights should not be 
transferable (by analogy!) to players engaged in more mundane interaction. 
Weitzenfeld makes a distinction between “homeomorphs” (i.e., analogues of 
the same kind) and “paramorphs” (i.e., analogues of different kinds). He 
points out that valid reasoning by analogy requires that “… [f]or an inference 
from some known properties of a particular to other properties, there must be 
some determining relations between the properties.  That is, the properties 
must be values of variables bound by a non-accidental relation.  This set of 
non-accidental relations I call the determining structure of the particular” 
(Weitzenfeld 1984 p. 142-3).   It is isomorphism of determining structures that 
validates the use of analogy. Thus, we may suggest that when agents in 
clusters make analogies across interaction situations, players rely on reasoning 
which involve comparisons of determining structures, for example, 
comparisons between what they believe are the forms of the relevant 
situations. Because it incurs fewer cognitive costs to make an analogy 
between homeomorphs than between paramorphs, the former may be a more 
prominent source of focal points than the latter. 
 
Information costs of analogy making 
It is likely that strategies resting upon paramorph analogies can only become 
focal points if they are circumscribed with advantages that offset their 
relatively higher cognitive costs. We propose that such advantages may be 
low information costs. If it is particularly easy to obtain the information 
needed to apply a strategy ⎯  for example, through information services or 
through gossip within a cluster  ⎯, it may be repeatedly chosen by agents, 
even if the analogy making associated with it is relatively taxing. Whereas 
cognitive costs are determined by the abilities of the agents who make an 
analogy, information costs are determined by the nature of the cluster as a 
whole ⎯ in particular, how agents are connected in social networks that 
enable them to obtain information. 
 In conclusion, this section has suggested that when focal points are 
formed, it happens through experimentation and imitation, and that agents are 
likely to experiment with those strategies that incur the lowest cognitive and 
information costs first. Agents can experiment with applying a strategy that 
has been applied in earlier situations ⎯ if such situations were similar to the 
present, the analogy is easily made. If the re-application of this strategy 
proves efficient, it is consistently applied. If not, for example because it 
proves costly in terms of money, time, or information, agents may experiment 
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with analogies which incurs higher cognitive costs, but may also yield higher 
pay-offs.  
 
VI. An Empirical Example9
 
As a way of illustrating the propositions put forward above, we now turn to an 
empirical example. By means of the notions of cognitive coordination, focal 
points, and analogy making, we shall try to explain the growth of one of the 
successful furniture producing and exporting clusters of the world: The 
Danish Salling industrial district. It should be noted that what follows is in no 
way an empirical test of the validity of our propositions.  Such a test is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, withstanding the limitations of the case 
study method, the practical application of our propositions to the Salling case 
has indeed proved useful, and hence lends them some merit. 
 
Coordination tasks in the furniture industry 
The European furniture industry mainly consists of SMEs, due both to 
production technology and the predominance of traditional management 
styles. Recent globalization of competition has led to only modest 
restructuring and consolidation of the industry. Because of the volatility of 
consumer markets and growing demands for product varieties and 
innovations, there is an increasing pressure on furniture producers to 
specialize and outsource further (Maskell et al 1998; Lorenzen 1998; 1999). 
Most networks of specialized firms consist of independent firms, and there 
seems to be little scope for joint ownership or other types of formalized 
governance. This form of industrial organization implies particular tasks of 
coordination. 
 First, there is a category of tasks related to bargaining. The diversity of 
customer demands necessitates many specialized furniture producers to 
shifting between particular suppliers, while maintaining a core of dedicated 
suppliers. After firms have obtained information on which suppliers have the 
right qualifications and capacity at the appropriate time, and judged with 
whom to enter into relations, they still face the task of agreeing with their 
supplier upon price and quality levels.  Second, there is a category of tasks 
related to governance. In order to cooperate, managers need to align 
expectations with respect to a host of variables, many of which are not 
(perhaps cannot) described in contracts.  However, furniture production 
systems consist of specialized independent manufacturers. In such systems, 
there may be larger scope for opportunism and malfeasance between buyers 
and suppliers than if all the production units were under the same ownership.  
                                                          
9  This section builds on Foss and Lorenzen  (forthcoming 2002). 
14 
Unfortunately, within the furniture industry, contract writing is often inhibited 
by high costs (both in terms of transaction costs and loss of the flexibility and 
speed of delivery, which is so important on furniture markets)(Lorenzen 1998; 
1999). 
 
Coordination problems and solutions in the furniture industry 
There is a host of incentive-related and cognitive aspects to these bargaining 
and governance tasks.  Concerning bargaining, the solution may be to rely 
upon standards. However, great incentive conflicts between firms (and other 
stakeholders in the industry) may surface when a standard is to be set. In our 
terminology, there is a potential incentive-related coordination problem here, 
which may be found within the furniture industry. In the furniture industry, 
many local standards also evolve organically rather than being set by a central 
body. However, how standards evolve is not a trivial problem. A manager 
may face a problem of choosing the same standard as his potential partner. 
  Concerning governance, what drives down its costs in some of the most 
successful furniture producing regions of Europe (notably, the Italian or 
Danish industrial districts), is only rarely incentive alignment through 
contractual means (or if too costly, through ownership). Rather, it would be 
more correct to say that managers’ expectations are aligned through common 
focal points like social conventions.  In turn, this cognitive coordination 
allows for the smooth operation of reputational effects and contracting which 
also characterize these regions. In other words, the governance mode of 
furniture managers within many successful regions is social trust. Arguably, 
in the furniture industry, incentive alignment through contactual arrangements 
and reputational effects as a means to lowering transaction costs cannot take 
place without some level of social trust ⎯ because we cannot expect 
managers to commit themselves to sinking costs into their cooperative 
arrangements without some initial (aligned) expectations that they will not 
waste their investments (Lorenzen 1999).  
 
Regional competitiveness of the Danish Salling district 
Maskell et al. (1998) and Lorenzen (1998; 1999) argue that institutional 
endowments of regions determine their specialization and export success with 
regards to furniture manufacturing.  Conversely, Kautonen (1998) has 
explained the decline of furniture production in the Finnish Lathi region by 
means of its low level of social trust, and Kjær (1998) makes a similar 
argument concerning the Swedish furniture industry. Arguably, what 
determines success within the furniture industry is the ability of managers to 
solve coordination tasks, and predominantly those related to cognition.  
 In the following, we shall outline the case of the Danish Salling furniture 
district. Located around the Salling peninsular and Skive town in West 
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Jutland, the district encompasses a profound and growing agglomeration of 
specialized economic activity in Danish terms.10 Here, flexibly specialized 
small and medium-sized furniture firms dominate, reaping external scope, 
scale, and learning economies. Managers of furniture producers efficiently 
solve bargaining and governance tasks related to maintaining cooperative 
relations, and we shall exemplify how this is done on the basis of efficient 
cognitive coordination. We will also account for how cognitive coordination 
has evolved within the district. 
 The data presented was obtained in the period 1993-1998, through 27 
semi-structured interviews in firms and other local organizations (such as the 
local producers’ guild; the technical school; the union; a bank; a credit 
association; and the local industrial development agency). The mechanisms 
underlying the coordination patterns demonstrated through these interviews 
were then investigated through in-depth studies of three selected firms.11
 
Bargaining by analogy in the Salling district 
A first example concerns Salling managers’ solutions to bargaining problems. 
The tasks of aligning their interdependencies and designing flexible 
                                                          
10  In 1996, the seven municipalities of the Salling district comprised more than 54 
furniture producers and at least 2388 employees within this industry. Furniture 
production made up 33% of manufacture, and 28% of manufacturing 
employment. The export rate of the firms within the Salling district is higher 
than the high Danish average of 80%, and success stories have been frequent of 
Salling firms exploring new markets, branding products, and developing new 
designs. That the Salling district has in this way taken the lead when it comes to 
Danish furniture exports has not only meant growth of some existing producers 
⎯ it has also encompassed numerous start-ups of new small firms. Today, in 
spite of some firms that have grown to a considerable size, the average size of 
Salling furniture firms is still small. The small size of most firms seems not to 
hinder their economic development ⎯ based on their organizing still new 
networks aiming at subcontracting, exports, brands, or designs. Thus, apart from 
a few large firms, the growth of furniture production in the Salling district is 
accounted for by a particular group of firms (roughly, two thirds of the total 
number of local firms), with a large ability to cooperate. This section shall focus 
upon this core group (“Salling” will from now on refer to members of this 
group). 
11  The in-depth studies consisted of repeated semi-structured interviews, where 
findings were also validated, plus performing on-site observations of the 
activities of the manager-owners of the firms during the same week in the fall of 
1997 (time studies). This method for the in-depth studies allowed combining 
accounts for time expenditures, routines, external contacts, and information 
exchanges within the studied firms and between them and their partner firms 
with qualitative data on issues such as trust, communication, and cognition. 
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cooperation practices are solved through relying upon non-formalized and oral 
standards for prices, delivery quality, and delivery times.  
 Where do the focal points encapsulated in these standards come from? 
Price and quality levels are set as a part of negotiating processes between 
single suppliers and buyers. Because producers spread information in order to 
make their suppliers perform better, and suppliers often share price and 
quality information, collective standards quickly arise, as all suppliers have to 
make an effort to perform so well that their customers do not switch to other 
suppliers for price or quality reasons. Standards are regularly adjusted, and 
hence, cannot be considered as very stable focal points in themselves. 
However, the principle of utilizing standards is quite stable. Even if 
bargaining problems vary ⎯ since, for example, prices need adjustments 
more often than qualities ⎯ managers label and solve most bargaining 
situations the same way, making analogy to how earlier situations were 
solved.  
 Why is this analogy made, and why has the strategy of utilizing standards 
become a dominating principle? Clearly, utilizing the standards is an efficient 
and inexpensive means of solving a coordination task, and because managers 
exchange information and advice to a very high degree, they have taught each 
other to use them. Furthermore, as more and more suppliers are forced to 
comply to standards, and as more and more buyers rely on standards, the 
value as a focal point of this strategy continues to increase. 
 The twin cognitive problems of arriving at appropriate standards, plus 
choosing to use standards at all, are thus solved by social learning processes, 
circumscribed by the economic efficiency of using standards; the low 
information costs (ease of access) of standards; and social pressure towards 
complying to standards. 
 
Governance by analogy in the Salling district 
Even more illustrative for our purpose is to observe how Salling managers’ 
carry out the coordination tasks of governance. Roughly speaking, they find 
themselves in four different categories of interaction situations: 
• Downstream situations with agents or retailers (only faced by end 
producers).  
• Upstream situations with non-specialized suppliers. 
• Upstream situations with specialized suppliers. 
• Horizontal situations. 
In the first two categories of interaction situations, producers govern through 
contracts, as both retail chains and non-specialized suppliers demand this. 
However, the two next categories of interaction situations are excellent 
examples of cognitive coordination. Interviewed Salling managers claim that 
they are not very keen on the formalities necessitated by writing contracts 
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with agents, retailers, and non-specialized suppliers (mostly, none of these are 
not from the Salling district). In essence, in the vertical and horizontal 
interaction situations with local specialized suppliers, they rely on ascriptive 
trust rather than contracts. The typical Salling managers expect each other to 
refrain from opportunism, even when no types of non-contractual safeguards 
(such as credible commitments) are present.  
 Where does the basis for ascribing trust come from? The typical criteria 
for ascribing trust to another manager is that he follows a particular set of 
common local social norms (in essence, he should be a manager-owner, a 
quality-conscious rather than price-focused craftsman, and a local patriot) ⎯ 
plus, importantly, that he is a local. In particular, the local producers’ guild 
constitutes an efficient social group, where reputational effects prevent 
opportunism and reinforces social trust. The efficiency of the strategy of 
ascribing trust, the low costs of the information needed for ascribing trust 
according to the above criteria (i.e., gossip), plus the social learning effects 
within the producers’ guild are the reasons that this strategy has become so 
dominant. In fact, managers use this strategy in both vertical and horizontal 
interactions, even if they are very different in terms of products, standards, 
and so on. In spite of these differences, Salling managers label vertical and 
horizontal interactions between locals the same way, and re-apply strategies to 
new situations, i.e. expect each other to base each new deal on ascriptive trust, 
and to use the above criteria for trustworthiness. Most of the vertical 
(supplier) relationships in Salling are of much older date than horizontal 
networks. Thus, in the latter, analogy is made to the former in order to arrive 
at a governance strategy. 
  Why is this analogy made, and why has the strategy of relying upon 
ascriptive trust become a dominating principle? Interviews suggest that the 
governance strategy which is predominant in economic networks amongst the 
Salling managers has in fact emerged through analogy to informal interaction 
situations that have for long taken place in social networks amongst the 
managers. Ascribing trust on the account of the common social norms has for 
more than a decade been a strategy applied when meeting and making 
activities in the producers’ guild. In this forum, the strategy predates most of 
the economic networks between local firms. Up to the 1980s, there were few 
economic networks between Salling firms, and they were based on 
painstaking and slow trust-building processes and placement of credible 
commitments. With the expansion of the German market in the 1980s, the 
boom in the number of Danish furniture producers, and a larger technological 
scope for (and market pull towards) specialization and outsourcing, Salling 
managers increasingly began to “demand” trust. As a quicker means of 
achieving it, they begun to rely on third-party advice, as colleagues within the 
producers’ guild shared their positive experiences with other trustworthy 
18 
members of the producers’ guild. A particular group of managers among 
whom recommendations were frequent and reputational effects high emerged 
as a consequence. Most of the managers within this group have now, in need 
for a means of quickly and cheaply finding and trusting new partners for 
(short or long term) cooperative arrangements, developed a routine of 
searching for the partner within their own ranks, and trusting this partner, 
unless the trust placed in him is abused (which it, in part due to reputational 
effects, usually is not). Through social learning, step-by-step trust-building 
processes taking place in each individual network have become superseded by 
a common (social) ascriptive trust. The market efficiency of ascriptive trust (it 
allows firms to quickly, inexpensively, and flexibly coordinate and thus 
specialize and cooperate) means that more and more local producers are 
willing to experiment with it. Its value as a focal point hence increases in a 
self-reinforcing learning process. 
  
 
VII. Concluding remarks 
 
The discussion in this paper is highly speculative and roams widely.  The 
central proposition is that cognitive coordination plays a pivotal role for trust-
based cooperation and communication amongst entrepreneurs in a regional 
cluster. By arguing that agents to a very large extent may rely on analogy to 
earlier interaction situations in coordinating their actions, and that dense social 
networks facilitated by geographical proximity within a cluster function as a 
frame for analogy making, we have proposed an explanation for how and why 
cognitive coordination may be particularly efficient within regional clusters. 
We proposed that analogies that come up with solutions that are inefficient in 
the long or short term are most likely to be discarded.  Further, cognitive costs 
rising from lack of ideomorphism between two interaction situations might 
impede analogy making. The success of coordination through analogy 
depends on the extent to which the relevant analogies are homomorphs or 
paramorphs.  The more in the direction of paramorphs, the harder it will be for 
players to coordinate their analogies, and therefore their actions. Finally, we 
suggested that social learning is central for how interaction situations may 
“feed” into each other.  
 We applied our propositions about cognitive coordination and analogy 
making to the case of the Salling district and argued that our perspective could 
cast considerable light over the organization and development of this cluster. 
This theoretical approach to our case study meant that we were able to 
account empirically for one of its central features: The non-planned, 
decentralized coordination taking place between independent business units. 
In comparison, many existing empirical studies of industrial clusters limit 
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themselves to listing some of the symptoms of such coordination, for 
example, a range of local public and private institutions and associations. Our 
approach gave theoretical and empirical substance to phenomena like trust 
and social capital within the case cluster. We demonstrated how Salling 
managers who solve both problems of price bargaining and of quality 
bargaining by referring to collective standards, make homeomorph analogies. 
Because the price and quality bargaining situations have same variables 
(managers), relations between variables (subcontracting arrangements), and 
determining structure (e.g. risks and pay-offs), the analogy is cognitively 
inexpensive to make. The case however also gave evidence of linkage of 
dissimilar situations, namely managers that use a strategy for finding and 
trusting a partner by a paramorph analogy to how social life is conducted 
within the local producers’ guild.  This analogy is considerably more 
cognitively taxing. That a strategy resting upon a paramorph analogy ⎯ thus 
implying higher cognitive costs ⎯ could become a focal point solving 
governance problems amongst Salling managers can be explained by the high 
market efficiency of the strategy itself. Ascriptive trust facilitates flexible 
specialization and has helped Salling furniture firms in gaining considerable 
export shares. Furthermore, the strategy is supported by extremely low 
information costs, as the information needed in order to ascribe trust is readily 
available to the managers as gossip in the local producers’ guild. This 
observation on low information costs also applies to the strategy of relying on 
price and quality standards: It is easy for local suppliers to achieve 
information about the prices and qualities of other local suppliers as this is 
shared between managers. 
 We suggested that with time, cognitive coordination might become more 
efficient within a regional cluster, because focal points become more widely 
disseminated through social learning, and the emergence of new networks. As 
cognitive coordination in turn facilitates network building, the process of 
cognitive coordination may become self-reinforcing. That history matters so 
much for clusters may explain why it is so extremely difficult to imitate the 
functions of a cluster elsewhere, or to create one by design. However, the path 
dependence of clusters and the cumulative causation that may take place can 
also lead to lock-in and inefficiency. If world markets shift, or the structure of 
a cluster in other respects becomes inefficient, the dominance of particular 
focal points and hence particular ways of doing things can be a regional 
liability instead of an asset, as it prevents change. While strong focal points 
may facilitate technological innovation through facilitating firm interactions, 
they may prevent larger scale changes. The paper has not sought to deal with 
this question, nor the questions of why and how lock-in situations have been 
avoided by some clusters and not by others.  
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 The paper has only represented a first stab at accounting for coordination 
within clusters. Clearly, there is room for more substantial theoretical work 
here, as well for empirical testing. The Salling case was applied for the sake 
of illustration rather than testing. The case illustrated that cognitive 
coordination may indeed be a central feature of a cluster, and that the 
development of such cognitive coordination may be a long and complex 
process. The case also exemplified how geographical proximity and 
information costs are interrelated. There seems to be a rich potential for 
further empirical as well as theoretical research into the interrelations between 
these two phenomena. 
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